The Great Exclusion Game: How Everyone Lost Egypt’s Battle

(1)

In the aftermath of January 25, 2011, a state of fluidity prevailed, accompanied by an excess of dreams, wishes, and expectations. This was not limited to ordinary Egyptians—who, the moment Mubarak’s resignation was announced, rushed to calculators to estimate what share of Mubarak family wealth and the riches of his corrupt regime would eventually become theirs. The phenomenon spread even further, reaching Egypt’s intellectual circles across their various ideological camps, as many came to believe that ruling Egypt had suddenly become attainable and was now within reach.

This state of fluidity bordered on naivety. Every faction fancied itself the most entitled and worthy to rule Egypt, and the only one capable of lifting the nation out of its stagnation. However, this sense of entitlement soon collided with realities that proved entirely different from the conceptions of these factions, and often directly contradicted the illusions of the Egyptian intelligentsia.

The greatest shock befell the so-called Civil Current—meaning the liberal, leftist, and secular factions hostile to the Islamist current—when they quickly discovered they lacked a genuine popular base commensurate with their vocal presence, strength, and ubiquity on social media platforms. Later, they discovered that the Egyptian state—against which the people had revolted on January 25, 2011—was still ruling Egypt, steering it as it wished and moving it at will. The ultimate calamity struck when that very state forged an early alliance with the Islamist current during the March 2011 referendum, followed by a temporary "forbidden romance" between two arch-nemeses who could never permanently agree: political Islam and the Egyptian state. Perhaps the "Kandahar Friday" rally was one of the most prominent milestones of this fleeting romance, and the most shocking moment for the Civil Current.

With Mohamed Morsi’s ascension to power, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that Egypt had put on its finest apparel and adorned itself for them. The group’s rank-and-file and leaders began whispering loudly about "500 years of rule." At that precise moment, the Brotherhood, too, began harboring its own share of naivety, overblown perceptions, and illusions.

(2)

Among the illusions that led the Brotherhood to its demise was the assumption that it had entirely eliminated the Civil Current, in all its forms, from the game. From their perspective, this notion was consolidated and entrenched with the conclusion of the first round of the presidential elections, after the Civil Current failed to advance any of its affiliated or endorsed candidates to the run-off stage. Convinced of this assumption, the Brotherhood transitioned to the fatal moment: it was now the military’s turn.

Among the readings we can offer for the "Dawn Announcement" made by the group upon the conclusion of the run-off round between the presidential candidates (Morsi and Shafik) is that it was not merely a preemptive attempt to inaugurate Morsi and prevent the military from rigging the election results—as most analyses claimed at the time. Rather, the matter was far more serious. It was the moment the Brotherhood declared that the military’s turn had come to follow the Civil Current out of the game.

The "Dawn Announcement" was the opening whistle for a brutal, bone-crushing match. The scene was as follows:

• The two match contenders (the players): The military establishment and the Muslim Brotherhood.

• The referee: Accepted by both players with consent and high expectations, the United States of America.

Meanwhile, the Civil Current contentedly played the role of the spectator. The peak of this spectator role occurred during the final minutes of the match. It could be said that it transformed into a powerful "Ultras association," operating by the exact logic of such groups: cheering enthusiastically for its team and magnifying its players out of faith in its role and loyalty to its team, yet remaining a fan club that lacks even the power to enter the gates of the club it supports, adores, and remains devoted to.

(3)

We return to the "fatal Brotherhood illusion" that commenced with the "Dawn Announcement." The major success of the announcement, achieved through the military's acknowledgment of Morsi's victory, brought a moment of euphoria unparalleled in the group's history since its founding. As with any euphoria, it was invariably accompanied by intoxication, dreams, and delusions. This is precisely what happened to the group: it believed it had begun executing its plan to remove the military from the game, in the exact same manner the Civil Current had been ousted.

According to the Brotherhood's calculations, the group had successfully curried favor with the military and driven wedges between the military and the Civil Current until the military felt the group was the closest entity to them. Since the group was the most organized, the most capable of confrontation, and the best prepared to lead the race, it developed a conviction that the military truly had no choice but to accept the Brotherhood as its sole ally. Pragmatically, the Brotherhood was the frontrunner in any electoral contest—a reality made clear to all, including the military and the Civil Current, by the outcomes of the March referendum. Emotionally (as an alternative leverage to ideology), the Brotherhood succeeded in making the military feel they were the closest to them. After that, sidelining the Civil Current was merely a matter of time, and the first round of the presidential elections served as the formal ceremony announcing that exit.

By the exact same assumption, logic, and sequence, the Brotherhood believed that the military's turn had come. The "Dawn Announcement" can be viewed as the objective and chronological equivalent of the "March Referendum." Just as the latter was the moment marking the start of the mission to remove the Civil Current from the game, the former represented the moment marking the start of the mission to remove the military. Under this calculation, the scenario would repeat with only one variance: the military shifted its position from the first equation as the arbiter to become the target, replacing the Civil Current. In the second equation, the Americans replaced the military as the arbiter of the game. They indeed turned out to be the ultimate arbiters who aborted the Brotherhood’s game, entirely contrary to the group’s expectations.

(4)

We are thus faced with two players mediated by a referee. Each of the three parties was keen to project to the other two that it was closer to each one individually. The Brotherhood signaled to the military that it was closer to them than America was, and did the exact same with the Americans. The military signaled to the Americans that they were closer to them than the Brotherhood was, and did the exact same with the Brotherhood. Both players were certain that the American referee alone was capable of deciding the outcome in their favor—with an obvious advantage, of course, to the military, in whom America had invested over 50 billion dollars, coupled with the leaders of the establishment who were groomed under its watchful eye. This was the reality that eluded the Brotherhood, who believed that Obama’s desire to replicate Erdogan’s experience in Arab countries during the Spring would intercede for them and tip the scales in their favor.

Throughout their single year of governance, the Brotherhood remained convinced of the viability and seriousness of their game. If the Dawn Announcement was the chronological and objective equivalent of the March referendum, then the moment Field Marshal Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Anan were ousted can be said to represent the chronological and objective equivalent of "Kandahar Friday." This time, the euphoria was so immense that it perhaps surpassed the ecstasy of the "Dawn Announcement's" success in installing Morsi on the presidential throne. The Brotherhood believed in its ability to oust the military establishment not just from the game, but entirely from the Egyptian political landscape. Here lay the beginning of the false sense of security where caution is abandoned.

(5)

Another sin committed by the group was that it believed the military and America. It bought into the counter-game they executed against the group, even though it was, in reality, a carbon copy of the Brotherhood's own game previously deployed against the Civil Current and still being waged against the military. Astonishingly, the military's counter-game succeeded beyond measure.

The group's deficit of intellects, theorists, and dissenting voices from within served as a safety valve ensuring the success of the counter-game orchestrated by the military and America. The group possesses a closed religious mindset, reared on "Do not argue or debate, Brother Ali," and raised on "The brothers upstairs know everything." With Morsi’s rise to power, the phrase "The group upstairs holds everything in their hands, and the army is in their back pocket" was on the tongue of every member and sympathizer of the group—ranging from President Morsi himself down to the youngest member of the smallest family cell.

(6)

A third sin of the Brotherhood was that it bullied all other factions and underestimated the importance of the Civil Current. The group gradually abandoned its Islamist allies, mocking some, deriding the weak presence of others, and overtly despising the anxieties of a third faction.

As for the Civil Current, the Brotherhood believed that by ousting it from the game, it had become bedridden. Like any corporate sports team manufactured by money, the Brotherhood believed it had no need to fill its stadium stands with fans and Ultras associations. They even downplayed the significance of their role in fueling emotions, particularly since those fans were veterans of cheering, adept at igniting enthusiasm and winning over the audiences of non-competing teams. Like any corporate team, the group contented itself with mobilizing the company's own workers to cheer for them, "attack" the opposing side and the referee when necessary, and insult and assault the rival audience throughout the match.

(7)

Another matter stems from the aforementioned intellectual deficit within the group and the total absence of theorists and strategic thinkers within the Brotherhood. Had there been anyone to think on the group's behalf, they would have realized that in the literature of strategic communication and conflict management, parties are often viewed across a spectrum of positions: Enemy – Adversary/Competitor – Neutral – Sympathizer – Supporter/Ally. Consequently, strategy aims to achieve gradual transitions across these positions.

Applying this to the Civil Current, it was imperative for the group—had it possessed strategic foresight—to make its primary preoccupation, while waging its most dangerous game with the military, the application of this strategy to the Civil Current. If converting it into a sympathizer was impossible, they should have at least ensured its neutralization. However, all the group's actions led to the exact opposite: they lost numerous sympathizers from their own Islamist kin, and their enemy grew more hostile. On the other hand, the military successfully and intelligently executed this strategy. While they were portraying to the Brotherhood that they were closer to them than the Americans, they engaged in the exact same game with the Civil Current. For the Civil Current, this provided a false sense of importance and success, coming after it had developed a deep sense of failure and an inability to match the Brotherhood popularly and organizationally—a sentiment in which the military astutely invested.

(8)

The Brotherhood’s gamble in its game rested on two elements: their prior success with the Civil Current, and Obama’s desire to replicate Erdogan’s experience in the nations of the Arab Spring. Discussing Obama requires an important pause for clarification and exposition.

In his final days in office, during his famous interview with The Atlantic magazine, the publication headlined the interview with a prominent, striking term carrying undeniable connotations. The title was: "The Obama Doctrine." In the lexicon of American politics, the term "doctrine," when paired with a president's policies, signifies an action plan and a policy framework to which the United States will commit over the coming years. What, then, were the most prominent features of the Obama Doctrine? And how did it deceive the Brotherhood?

The Obama Doctrine was predicated on a pivot to exit the Middle East by freezing all files within it—particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear program, and the governing regimes in the region. Obama's rationale for this was the urgent need to dedicate more attention and resources to the emerging threat from Asia: China.

Obama believed that the Middle East and its conflicts had consumed and drained America’s energies and capabilities over more than six decades. While America was preoccupied with Middle Eastern conflicts, China was building its glory and accumulating the pillars of power on its path to rivaling the American empire, and perhaps even inheriting it eventually.

Therefore, Obama believed that America must gradually distance itself from the unceasing conflicts of the Middle East while freezing conditions in conflict arenas until the Chinese threat was managed. Obama’s vision for Middle Eastern files and conflicts was specific and clear: halting the Iranian pursuit of nuclear armament; securing Israel to guarantee the stability of its borders and rid it of surrounding threats, while restraining Netanyahu and curbing his expansionist ambitions; and ensuring the flow of oil and gas from the region and securing maritime routes by keeping the oil, gas, and maritime transit states stable and safe from any unfavorable gusts of revolutions or rebellions.

(9)

Egypt intersected here with three pillars of Obama’s vision: maintaining secure borders for Israel by reaffirming the commitment to peace, ensuring freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, and preserving Egypt from any unpredictable revolution that could not be guaranteed or controlled, as had occurred on January 25, 2011.

We return to the two sides of the game: the military and the Brotherhood. Regarding the first player, its past bears witness to it: the military had struck peace agreements with Israel, never compromised on them, and became more protective of Camp David than Israel itself. It also guarantees to the world the preservation of freedom and security of navigation in the Suez Canal—not only because of its vital importance as one of the most critical sources of national income in Egypt, but also because it represents a source of income, wealth, and influence for the leaders of the military establishment.

As for the Brotherhood: they pledged, through Mohamed Morsi himself (a report carried by CNN), to uphold Egypt’s international treaties, specifically the peace treaty with Israel. Regarding the Suez Canal, the matter required no pledge; Morsi’s ascension to power guaranteed the Brotherhood’s dedication to this vital facility due to its role as a potent source of national income, as previously mentioned.

Hence, the crux of the matter lay in the third pillar: who could guarantee to "Obama" that no unexpected rebellion or revolution would erupt, at least during the period of preoccupation with China? Obama's gamble was overt and explicit: political Islam. The American president wished to replicate Erdogan's experience in Egypt. The man was convinced that maintaining the stability of the region’s states—which possess a Sunni majority—required that this majority govern itself, to prevent its subsequent rebellion against its rulers in a manner that would threaten America's security and interests in the region. Consequently, political Islam was deemed the most qualified for this task, particularly given Erdogan's success in Turkey.

Obama believed that political Islam—specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, known for its historical ties to the West and its intelligence apparatuses, as well as its extreme pragmatism that would never object to relinquishing the "group's principles" even if the Brotherhood's base chanted those slogans daily—was the most fitting to assume governance and the most reliable guarantor of America’s interests. Obama went even further, believing they would be the ultimate guarantors of Israel’s security, given the group's organizational and ideological ties to the resistance in Gaza led by Hamas, a movement of undeniable Muslim Brotherhood origins (a link the movement severed later).

(10)

On this, the Brotherhood gambled. What, then, did the military gamble on?

For the military, their sole obstacle was Obama alone—the president in his official and personal capacity only. Meanwhile, the rest of the American institutions had absolutely no desire to gamble on the Brotherhood in a country like Egypt, where any tremor would trigger earthquakes whose echoes would reverberate across the entire region.

I incline toward the view that Egypt, as a state, falls under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon within the framework of role distribution in America. The military in America maintains exceptionally strong ties with their counterparts in Egypt, having invested more than 50 billion dollars in the Egyptian army since Camp David. Furthermore, the leaders of the military establishment were all molded under America’s supervision. (I recall an individual well-versed in information and intelligence once telling me that it is impossible to attain the rank of Major General in the Egyptian army without undergoing training courses in America, and that those whose ideological affiliations are suspect do not advance beyond the rank of Brigadier General).

Consequently, the American president is not the ultimate locus of influence or final decision-making regarding US foreign policy toward Egypt; rather, the Pentagon is. If that is the case, what would compel the Pentagon to sacrifice a partner it had tested for more than three decades, and whose subordination and commitment to preserving Israel's security and freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal were absolute? If Obama's rationale for gambling on the Brotherhood was to prevent future revolutions, the Pentagon understood that the Egyptian army was capable of crushing any rebellion, provided America did not intervene and blackmail it under the pretext of human rights. This is precisely what the Pentagon guaranteed would not happen, and indeed what occurred following the 2013 military coup, which the Pentagon supported with utmost vigor despite Obama’s opposition.

(11)

Even if we assume an equality of weight between the backers of each side in the game—with the Brotherhood backed by the White House and the military backed by the Pentagon, though they are by no means equal—why did the scales tip in favor of the military? And why did Obama not attempt to work toward the reinstatement of the Brotherhood?

The answer is perfectly clear: the Battle of Al-Qusayr.

Erdogan was one of the staunchest proponents of Obama’s vision to bring political Islam to power in the nations of the Arab Spring, specifically in Egypt and Syria. Here, we must step back slightly into the Arab Spring.

America’s objectives regarding the Arab Spring were transparent: First, the ouster of regimes that posed a clear, explicit, and direct threat to US interests and Israeli security, specifically Syria and Libya. Second, the smooth transition of power from rulers nearing death or whose regimes were on the brink of collapse to successors who would guarantee greater subordination to America, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia. As mentioned, Obama leaned toward the Brotherhood succeeding Mubarak in Egypt.

It is no secret the role Turkey played in facilitating the transit of thousands of mercenaries and terrorists into Syria to fight and overthrow the Syrian regime, in addition to the billions of dollars spent by Qatar (the patron of the Brotherhood) to topple the Syrian state under the pretext of liberating the Syrian people. This alliance sought to overthrow the regime because of its role as a vital link in the supply chain arming the resistance, particularly in Lebanon—and not for the liberation of the people as claimed by the mercenaries of Turkey and Qatar, such as Al-Julani and his cohorts. This aligned with the "Obama Doctrine" to secure Israel's periphery before turning attention to China. However, the overt and direct military, political, and diplomatic support from Russia and Iran thwarted the dream of Erdogan, Qatar, and Obama.

As for the Brotherhood, their ultimate catastrophe materialized in the Battle of Al-Qusayr in 2013.

(12)

The Battle of Al-Qusayr 2013 was a military confrontation pitting the Syrian Army and Hezbollah on one side against Syrian opposition forces—chiefly the Free Syrian Army and the Al-Nusra Front (Al-Julani)—on the other. It lasted 18 days (May 19 to June 5) and concluded with the Syrian Army gaining control over the city.

The battle in Al-Qusayr was deemed decisive by both sides of the conflict. For the Syrian government and Hezbollah, securing control would allow the government to link Homs and Damascus, consolidate control over Homs, and connect army forces to the Mediterranean coast and the port of Tartus. For Hezbollah, it was vital to protect its supporters in Lebanon from attacks by the terrorists of Al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army. Furthermore, Al-Qusayr served as a critical supply route from Lebanon, as well as for Lebanese Sunni fighters crossing the border to fight alongside Al-Julani’s followers in Syria.

With the defeat of the followers of Erdogan, Qatar, and Obama in Al-Qusayr, Obama's inability to realize his vision became undeniable, casting doubt upon the entirety of the Obama Doctrine. The most critical question now centered on the soundness of the American pivot away from the Middle East, in light of the failure to secure Israel's periphery and the inability to overthrow the Assad regime. The outcome of the Battle of Al-Qusayr also extended to the rest of Obama’s gambles, chief among them the failure of relying on Sunni Islam in the region.

Following the crushing defeat of Qatar and Turkey's followers in Al-Qusayr, Egypt’s Brotherhood (who were also aligned in a coalition with Qatar and Turkey) realized that the repercussions of the defeat would reach them. However, it was a belated realization that resulted in reckless, erratic behaviors that exacerbated the situation. On June 15, Morsi delivered his famous speech at a conference, attacking Hezbollah and the Assad regime. He uttered his famous line: "There is no place for Hezbollah in Syria... At your service, O Syria," and announced the severance of relations with Syria. This occurred after he hosted a gathering of terrorists wishing to wage jihad in Syria or those responsible for dispatching youth there—just as he had previously hosted the assassins of Sadat during the anniversary celebration of the October War!

The group was attempting to send messages on three levels through the conference to support the "revolution" in Syria: domestic, regional, and international. The domestic message aimed to escape Salafi blackmail directed at the group after hosting Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Egypt, which had triggered a fierce Salafi campaign targeting Morsi and the Brotherhood, escalating to accusations of adopting Shiism and pandering to those who insult Aisha.

The regional message was directed at their fellow travelers in the region, particularly Qatar and Turkey, along with Saudi Arabia—which, despite standing with Qatar and Turkey in Syria, remained hostile to their ally in Egypt. As for the international message, it was directed at America's two wings: Obama, whose position had become frustrated and weakened, and the Pentagon, which had become more certain of the validity of its stance rejecting political Islam. The message aimed to convince America to grant them some time to mount another attempt against the Syrian regime, with a promise of success this time. Morsi and his group fancied that such messages would find a listening or caring ear, and they persisted in their gamble on Obama, unaware that the Pentagon’s arrow had already been shot and its decision finalized.

(13)

The Pentagon’s sword preempted the Brotherhood's excuses. All cards turned against the group: the military managed their battle with immense cunning and guile, and the Americans settled their matter with a resounding victory for the Pentagon's preference. Even the Civil Current in Egypt finally felt its chest healed and its thirst for vengeance slaked regarding the group, its arrogance, and its haughtiness. They gloated over its misfortune, completely oblivious to their true size and the nature of their role in the game.

The Civil Current believed that the army had overthrown an elected civilian president merely to allow them to sit on the throne. However, they quickly discovered the reality of their role and size, and soon followed the Brotherhood into prisons, detention centers, exiles, and graves.

Today, 13 years after those events, the Brotherhood persists in their stubbornness (the group has never issued a clear and explicit apology for their betrayal of the revolution and their conspiracy against it with the military). Likewise, the Civil Current remains mired in its pipe dreams, illusions, and deep-seated rancor over the Islamists' ability to penetrate the Egyptian street (nor have they apologized for their ignorance, which rendered them a mere vehicle for the military in 2013).

As long as our condition remains trapped between governments and an opportunistic opposition, the fate and future of Egypt remain grim and dark, precisely as the martyr Jamal Hamdan warned in his private memoirs.